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Abstract 
This paper argues that the different bargaining strengths between music creators and music 
companies results in inefficient and unfair copyright revenue distrribution. On that basis it 
suggests two forms of regulatory intervnetion. Fair Trade Music is a voluntary certification 
scheme which would set a satndard of ‘fair remuneration’. The second option is mandatory 
regulation of the distribution of copyright revenue to ensure a minimum proportion goes to 
the music creator. Both schemes are considered against the benefits and obstacles in their 
practical implementation, ability to achieve the regulatory goal, political reactions and 
international obligations. Ultimately, this paper does not recommend adoption of a 
mandatory regulation and advises a cautionary approach  to Fair Trade Music. Ostensibly it 
is unlikely the government will pursue either regulatory response without some politcal 
impetus. 
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I Introduction  
The internet era has heard the cries of the music industry hailing the end of music as we know 
it due to copyright infringement. “The artists will not be paid” they lament, and then request 
strengthening of copyright laws. Rather than focusing on copyright infringement, which is 
where much of the debate has been focused, this paper will scrutinise the music industry 
itself. The extent to which piracy is affecting the music industry in general, and music 
creators specifically is not a question this paper seeks to answer. Instead, it argues that the 
structure of the music industry is leading many music creators to receive unfair remuneration 
for their work. Many economists and policy makers have acted on the assumption that the 
interests of creators and distributors are aligned, but there is evidence that this is not the case. 
Copyright is premised on creators having exclusive rights to their work which they can 
exploit, usually to earn money. Different jurisdictions and different individuals offer various 
rationales for why this right exists: some state that it is to provide an incentive for artists to 
create work which benefits society, others claim that artists deserve compensation for their 
hard work, and there are other rationales besides. This paper proceeds on the basis of a 
financial incentive rationale for copyright, regardless, the fundamental point that this paper 
and the various rationales for copyright share is the idea that the author should be paid for 
their work. On that basis the exploitation of music creators by the music industry, often for 
little to no remuneration, presents a problem.  
A possible solution to this problem is regulation. This paper proposes two possible 
regulations and discusses the benefits and concerns regarding their implementation in New 
Zealand. A brief note, the discussion of copyright and market failure that creates the basis for 
the regulations is a general discussion, not specific to the New Zealand jurisdiction except 
where noted, though the analysis of the regulations put forward by this paper is from the 
perspective of New Zealand implementation.  
The first part of this paper will outline the legal framework for copyright in New Zealand and 
then enter a general discussion about its rationales, referring mainly to the financial incentive 
justification. The second part will then discuss the market failure resulting from the unequal 
bargaining positions between music creators and the music industry, before moving away 
from economics to discuss regulating that relationship as a substantive political goal. The 
third part of the paper will introduce Fair Trade Music, a voluntary certification scheme. It 
will discuss some of the difficulties in implementing such a scheme and outline prerequisites 
for implementation. A mandatory regulatory scheme setting a minimum proportion of 
revenue to be given to the music creator is discussed in the fourth section of this paper. 
Again, the benefits of such a scheme will be highlighted as well as issues with 
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implementation, including the legitimacy of effectively regulating foreign contracts. Finally, I 
will briefly conclude on the overall desirability of these regulatory responses.  
II Copyright 
A Legal Framework 
The purpose of copyright is to prevent others from exploiting a work without permission.1 
Historically, this meant preventing others from copying the work without authorisation.2 This 
remains at the core of copyright, but has been added to a list of other restricted acts which 
only the copyright holder is permitted to do. Copyright infringement will occur whenever one 
of these acts is done by anyone else without a licence.3  
Copyright law in New Zealand is largely governed by the Copyright Act 1994. The Act holds 
that something will be copyrighted if it falls within a category of ‘works’ listed in s 14. It 
must be original;4 be a form of expression, not simply an idea; be recorded (for certain 
works); and meet other qualifications.5 A list of restricted acts is given in s 16 of the Act and 
largely covers unauthorised copying, disseminating of copies, or making available the work 
to the public. A copyright will usually endure for 50 years after the author dies.6 It is also 
worth noting that as a property right, copyrights can be licenced.7 
B The Justifications of Copyright 
The justifications and goals given for copyright are varied and are often highlighted or 
ignored depending on the law under debate or the argument that an academic, policy maker, 
copyright owner or any other interested party is making.8 One widely accepted justification 
of copyright law in common law countries is the utilitarian model or the incentive-access 
paradigm.9 This justification treats copyright as “a device for balancing incentives for 
creators against public access”.10  
Broadly put, the idea is that the cost of creating an original work is high, both in time and 
effort, whereas the cost of copying the work is comparatively low. Once copies are available 
                                                          
1  Paul Sumpter Intellectual Property Law: Principles in Practice (2nd ed, CCH, Auckland, 2013)  at 68. 
2  Sumpter, above n 1 at 68. 
3  Sumpter, above n 1 at 68. 
4  Copyright Act 1994, s 14.  
5  Copyright Act, s 18 and Sumpter, above n 1 at 5.  
6  Copyright Act, s 22(6). 
7  Copyright Act, s 111 and Sumpter, above n 1 at 53. 
8  See for example various justifications which have been espoused in Canada: Daniel Gervais “A 
Canadian Copyright Narrative” (2009) 11 J. World Intell. Prop. 432. 
9  Katie Sykes “Towards a Public Justification of Copyright” (2003) 61(1) U. Toronto. Fac. L. Rev. 1 at 2, 5, 
and 24.  
10  Sykes, above n 9 at 2. 
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it is often inexpensive to create more copies, or to disseminate them. If the author prices their 
work at close to the cost of producing one additional copy (marginal cost) then they may 
compete in the market, but they may not recoup the value of the resources spent creating the 
work.11 If the author prices their work at higher than marginal cost, people may not buy it 
because cheaper copies are available to them from copiers who price near marginal cost. The 
result is a market failure, which is what copyright aims to remedy.  
This widely accepted justification for copyright law as a remedy to market failure, rests on 
the idea that original artistic works are in the public interest.12 Society, or academics and 
governments at least, consider original artistic works to be in the public interest.  For 
example, the United States’ Constitution states that copyright law may be enacted “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”,13 Barbara Friedman describes a thriving 
culture as one where as many original works as possible are available,14 and Judge Leval 
writes that copyright “embodies a recognition that creative intellectual activity is vital to the 
well being of society”.15 Robert Merges notes that “countless judges begin their intellectual 
property decisions with…[a] ‘stage-setter’ about how intellectual property protection exists to 
serve the public interest.”16 
While these statements all originate in the United States they are indicative of a general 
attitude towards copyright.  
Thus the goal of copyright law within this paradigm is to provide the public with the highest 
level of access to artistic works, by balancing the incentive to produce the work with public 
access to the work. The optimum balance is where the public has access to the highest level 
of original works.17  
It is worth acknowledging that this justification has faced criticisms, predominantly that the 
balance between the competing interests has never been adequately identified, and possibly 
cannot be precisely delineated, and that our copyright law does not embody this paradigm.18 
It has also faced accusations of being created at the behest of certain interest groups, rather 
                                                          
11  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” (1989) 18 J. Leg. 
Stud. 325 at 325.   
12  Landes and Posner, above n 11 at 325 and Sykes above n 9 at 24. 
13  Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, section 8. 
14  Barbara Friedman “From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Copyright” (1994) 13 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 157 at 158. 
15  Pierre Leval “Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C. Brance Memorial Lecture” (1989) 36 J. 
Copyright Soc’y 167 at 169.  
16  Robert Merges Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass),  2011) at 
3. 
17  Merges above n 16 at 2.  
18  Glynn Lunney Jr. “Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm” (1996) 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483 
at 487 and Merges above n 16 at 3 
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than as an attempt to secure the production of a public good.19 Regarding the first of these, I 
will merely point out that simply because a goal is not being optimally achieved, or is 
difficult to optimally achieve, does not necessarily make it any less desirable. In response to 
the second, Katie Sykes makes the argument that the law understands itself as a justificatory 
enterprise:20  
Even if as a matter of historical fact copyright emerged at the instigation of certain interest 
groups, as law it presents itself as normatively grounded in values that transcend its historical 
origins. 
These responses, while brief, are all that are required for a paper of this nature, which deals 
with the justifications of copyright only peripherally.  
III Regulation  
One of the central issues around which modern copyright debates revolve is the balance of 
power which comes from copyright law and regulation.21 This paper argues that the 
distribution of remuneration between music creators and music companies is imbalanced in 
favour of music companies, which undermines the incentive aspect of copyright. This 
situation creates a case for regulatory intervention.  
The discussion below will outline the reasons for the imbalance and why it justifies a 
regulatory response. It will do this by reference to welfare economics and political 
substantive goal theories. The issues underlying the imbalance in distribution of copyright 
revenue will be discussed generally, as the exploitation of music by copyright contracts is a 
global feature of the music industry, however the specific regulatory responses are discussed 
from the perspective of New Zealand implementation. 
A Justification for the regulation 
Regulation is not the appropriate mechanism for government intervention in all instances. 
Instead, the necessity for regulation should be justified before a government takes legislative 
action. The welfare economics approach focuses on market failure, and has been described by 
Ogus as: “regulation is justified because the regulatory regime can do what the market 
cannot”.22 Substantive political approaches can be used complementarily to a welfare 
                                                          
19  Sykes, above n 9 at 14.  
20  Sykes, above n 9 at 14 and Merges above n 16 at 9 and 14. Merges also notes that changing the 
foundation of intellectual property would not affect its day-to-day operation (9), and suggests 
normative foundations (14).  
21  Bethany Klein, Giles Moss and Lee Edwards Understanding Copyright (Sage Publications, London, 
2015) at 20. 
22  Anthony Ogus extract in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung An Introduction to Law and Regulation: 
Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) at 18. 
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economics approach, and use non-economic substantive goals to justify regulatory 
intervention.23 I argue that both of these approaches may be relied upon to justify regulatory 
intervention in the music industry.  
1 Welfare economics 
At a high level, welfare economics can be understood as being concerned with allocative 
efficiency, that is, putting resources to their most valuable use.24 Theoretically, an ideal 
market will generate allocative efficiency, but this often does not occur in reality.25  
Alonso and Watt describe an efficient distribution of copyright income as one where neither 
party (creator and distributor) to the contract can benefit from a change without making the 
other party worse off. 26 This is called Pareto efficiency. The level of risk aversion between 
the parties will affect the efficient sharing of the revenue. For example, in music contracts, 
the creator is often more risk averse than the distributor.27 In this situation it is more efficient 
for the creator to have a higher proportion of revenue when low revenue is earned, and a 
lower proportion when a high revenue is earned.28 This ensures a somewhat steady income 
for the risk averse creator, and means the less risk averse distributor has the chance to obtain 
a greater benefit. However, many real world copyright contracts provide for royalties to grow 
alongside revenue.29 This is almost always inefficient.30 
The optimally efficient share of revenue is difficult to establish in practice, so the Nash 
Bargaining Solution has been suggested as an easier way to calculate efficient revenue 
distribution.31 According to the Solution, the most efficient royalty contract is one that 
awards each party a proportion of revenue equal to their relative bargaining power.32 
However, music creators often have very weak bargaining positions relative to music 
distributors.33 This is due to differences in the “independent wealth and outside opportunities 
for each party (that is, the relative need of each for the distribution contract to exist)”.34 More 
                                                          
23  Morgan and Yeung, above n 22 at 27. 
24  Ogus in Morgan and Yeung, above n 22 at 18.  
25  Ogus in Morgan and Yeung, above n 22 at 18. 
26  Jorge Alonso and Richard Watt “Efficient distribution of copyright income” in Wendy Gordon and 
Richard Watt (eds) The Economics of Copyright (Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton (Mass), 2003) 
81 at 82 and Ruth Towse “Copyright policy, cultural policy and support for artists” in Wendy Gordon 
and Richard Watt (eds) The Economics of Copyright (Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton (Mass), 
2003) 66 at 69. The reasons for this are further discussed below.  
27  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 88. 
28  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 88.  
29  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 88. 
30  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 89. 
31  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 91, see also John Nash “The Bargaining Problem” (1950) 18(2) 
Econometrica 155. 
32  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 91. 
33  Towse, above n 26 at 69. 
34  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 92. 
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specifically, because individual artists often have poor access to the capital market and rely 
on companies to distribute their work, they do not usually have surplus money and must sell 
their work quickly.35 Additionally they have considerably less experience in the market.36 
This weak bargaining position leads to standard royalty contracts with 10-15% of sales 
revenue reserved for creators.37  
Alonso and Watt specifically state that they have not considered the desire to ensure a 
sufficient incentive for artists to produce original works,38 and even they find it economically 
difficult “to defend cases where the creator ends up with a share that may be as low as 10% 
of total revenue”.39 Once one considers the view that creative works are beneficial to the 
public, and the finding that artists respond to increased earnings by devoting more time to 
artistic work, it becomes even harder to justify such low royalties as economically efficient.40  
Regarding creator responses to increased earnings, there is debate about the extent to which, 
or indeed whether, financial rewards play an incentivising role in the production of creative 
works.41 There are many examples of creative production without economic reward.42 Some 
music creators may well produce music, or produce more or higher quality music, as a result 
of financial incentives, but this assumption does not speak to the values of all music 
creators.43 This paper will rely on the assumption that financial incentive does play a role in 
the production of musical works. This is partly because copyright is premised on the idea that 
creators ought to be paid, whether to incentivise the production of creative works or because 
they deserve to be remunerated if a market for their work exists,44 and partly because the true 
motivations for creating music remain somewhat ambiguous even to scholars of cultural 
economics.45  
The ideal distribution of revenue between music creators and other parties (mainly music 
companies) to achieve the optimal production of music in the public interest is outside the 
scope of this paper, which is focused on regulation rather than an economic analysis. 
                                                          
35  Towse, above n 26 at 69. 
36  Towse, above n 26 at 69. 
37  Towse, above n 26 at 69 and Alonso and Watt above n 26 at 92. Also see Sara Karubian “360° Deals: 
An Industry Reaction to the Devaluation of Recorded Music” (2009) 18. S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 395 at 
440 which states the traditional royalty contract for newcomers gives 13-16% of revenue.  
38  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 82. 
39  Alonso and Watt, above n 26 at 93. 
40  Towse, above n 26 at 68 and Ruth Towse “Partly for the Money: Rewards and Incentives to Artists” 
(2001) 54 KYKLOS 473 at 482. 
41  Towse, above n 26 at 69 and William Patry How To Fix Copyright (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2011) at 14. 
42  Patry above n 41 at 14.  
43  Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 69.  
44  Merges, above n 16 at 2-3. 
45  Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 70.  
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Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that there is an imbalance between the music 
businesses and music creators, in terms of financial reward, in favour of businesses, which is 
allocatively inefficient and makes a prima facie case for a regulatory response. I will outline 
that argument now. 
2 Application of welfare economics to the music industry 
Copyright allows creators to hold the exclusive rights in their work, which they may then 
exploit or trade as they see fit. This trading is done via contracts, so it follows that those 
contracts are central to the consideration of allocative efficiency.46 Towse points out that 
Anglo-Saxon copyright law, and many economists, have assumed that the interests of 
creators and distributors are in harmony and are equally served by copyright.47 This is true in 
the sense that both wish to profit from the exploitation of artistic works but those interests 
conflict when it comes to the distribution of that revenue.48  
As discussed above, music distributors have a stronger bargaining position than music 
creators. This unequal bargaining position occurs because of “an oversupply of creative 
ambitions and winner-takes-all demand patterns”, which have had two main effects on 
copyright contracting: First,49  
since many more products want to enter the market than can be consumed, there is an 
important role for the commercial intermediary, acting as selector or gatekeeper. Publishers 
[and] record companies … will play this role for different markets. The bargaining power of 
artists early in their career is therefore weak. 
This position is made worse because the majority of creators competing in a large labour pool 
for which there is relatively low demand have a lower capacity to take financial risks 
compared to music distributors and, relatedly, their low capital reserves often force them to 
sell their work shortly after creating it.50 
Secondly,51 
                                                          
46  Niva Elkin-Koren and Eli Salzberger The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property in the Digital Age 
(Routledge, New York, 2013) at 149 and Ruth Towse “Copyright and Economics Incentives: An 
Application to Performers’ Rights in the Music Industry” (1999) 52 KYKLOS 369 at 372. 
47  Towse, above n 26 at 70-71 and Towse, above n 46 at 371. 
48  Towse, above n 26 at 71. 
49  Towse, above n 26 at 69 and Martin Kretchmer and others The Relationship Between Copyright and 
Contract Law (study commissioned by the Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property, UK, 
2010) at 66. 
50  Towse, above n 26 at 69. 
51  Kretchmer, above n 49 at 66. 
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despite ever more sophisticated marketing efforts, commercial intermediaries have been 
unable to predict demand patterns in winner-take-all markets. Nobody knows the next hit. 
Only a small percentage of releases will repay their initial investment. Market intermediaries 
tend to favour known artists with a track record. The bargaining power of consistently 
successful artists is therefore high. 
Thus the demand for music creators is not distributed evenly; it tends to concentrate on 
already established and popular ‘superstar’ creators.52 The result is that the few elite creators 
have a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis music companies, compared to less established 
creators, so tend to receive better contractual terms including higher royalty entitlements.53 
Moreover “a severe lack of transparency makes it difficult for rights holders to evaluate the 
compensation they receive or take action to change it”.54 
None of this is particularly new. Artists have long had limited bargaining power due to the 
structure of the music industry and restrictive contracts have existed for some time.55 It is 
even economically justified to some extent. Copyright contracts are a way of sharing risk 
between the contracting parties, and financially a music company can take on higher risks 
than a music creator.56 It follows that they should be able to gain higher rewards than a music 
creator. However, the disparity between the revenue that music companies and music creators 
are entitled to under these contracts is too high in many cases. Watt concluded, after creating 
an analytical model of the optimal royalty contract, that typical contracts are linear and 
inefficient at maximising creator utility.57 The revenue derived from copyrights in music 
often either does not reach music creators, or reaches them only minimally.58 This is due both 
to the increase in work-for-hire contracts, in which copyright and royalties attaching to it are 
transferred to company employing the musician, and traditional contracts which reduce the 
economic reward for music creators attaching to their copyrights by distributing a large share 
of it to the music company.59  
The issue of insufficient revenue for music creators has been exacerbated by the rise of music 
piracy. The record industry has responded to the threatened loss of profits by shifting to 
                                                          
52  Towse, above n 26 at 69. 
53  Ruth Towse “Copyright and Artists: A View from Cultural Economics” (2006) 20(4) J. Econ. Surv. 567 at 
578 
54  Pierre-É. Lalonde Study Concerning Fair Compensation for Music Creators in the Digital Age 
(Commissioned by International Council of Creators of Music, Nashville, 2014) at 28.  
55  Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 22. 
56  Towse, above n 46 at 370 and 375.  
57  Richard Watt Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes? (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 
(UK), 2000) in Alonso and Watt above n 26 at 70 and Richard Watt “Licensing and Royalty Contracts 
for Copyright” (2006) 3(1) Rev. Econ. Research Copyright Issues 1 at 10. 
58  Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 63-64 and 70. 
59  Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 64 and 70. 
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contracts with creators that control more revenue sources.60 These are known as ‘360 deals’ 
and include not just the rights to revenue from recordings, but also associated activities like 
touring and merchandising.61 While the distribution of revenue under these deals appears, at 
first blush, to be more favourable to artists, including newcomers,62 in reality they bring a 
previously independent source of creator earnings within the control of the music company.63  
Many artists make very little money from their records, and non-recording activities may be 
an important source of income.64 Allowing music companies to obtain a share of these 
revenues, often a majority share in the case of creators who signed contracts as newcomers, is 
likely to perpetuate or worsen the distributive inefficiency in many copyright contracts.65 
There has been discussion about whether the internet might provide a mechanism through 
which music creators could circumvent music companies altogether.66 For example, in 2007 
Radiohead released the album In Rainbows independently of a record company and simply 
asked consumers to pay what they wished as well as contracting with iTunes to distribute the 
album.67 The album was a financial success and conservative estimates predict that 
Radiohead made more than $6.5 million from the pay-what-you-want model alone.68 
However, most music creators, and especially newcomers to the industry, could not have 
implemented this strategy. The band’s frontman, Thom Yorke, stated in an interview that:69 
the only reason we could even get away with this, the only reason anyone even gives a shit, is 
the fact that we’ve gone through the whole mill of the business in the first place. It’s not 
supposed to be a model for anything else. It was simply a response to a situation. We’re out of 
contract. We have our own studio. We have this new server...But it only works for us because 
of where we are. 
                                                          
60  Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 22; Gail Mitchell “Jay-Z talks Exit Rumours, Grammys, 360 
Deals” BILLBOARD (USA online ed, 14 December 2007) in Karubian, above n 37 at 434; Karubian 
above n 37 at 423; and Matt Stahl and Leslie Meier “The Frim Foundation of Organizational Flexibility: 
The 360 Contract in the Digitalizing Music Industry” (2012) 37 CJC 441 at 442.  
61  Karubian, above n 37 at 399 and 427.  
62  Karubian, above n 37 at 331 Paramore received 30% of profits which is double the 13-16% available 
under the traditional model. 
63  Karubian, above n 37 at 434. 
64  Karubian, above n 37 at 434 and Matt Stahl “From Seven Years to 360 Degrees: Primitive 
Accumulation, Recording Contracts, and the Means of Making a (Musical Living)” (2011) 9(2) TripleC 
(Cognition, Communication, Co-Operation): Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information 
Society 668 at 674.  
65  Karubian, above n 37 at 428-431: majority share of 70% in Paramore’s case 
66  See for example Towse, above n 46 at 377 and Karubian, above n 37 at 396 
67  Karubian, above n 37 at 395. 
68  Karubian, above n 37 at 395 and David Downs “Radiohead’s In Rainbows Leads to Digital Pot of Gold” 
SF Weekly (San Francisco, USA, 10 October 2007). 
69  Interview with Thom Yorke, Radiohead frontman (David Byrne, Wired Magazine, 18 December 2007) 
transcript at <www.wired.com> “David Byrne and Thom Yorke on the real Value of Music”. 
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This quote recognises the high costs of recording and the massive advantage afforded by an 
established fan base, which mitigates the financial risks of creating music.70 “The popular 
music side of the record industry...is inherently risky, as consumers’ tastes are fickle and, in 
the case of new performers, unformed.”71 The only creators who are likely to be able to 
circumvent recording companies by using the internet are successful, already established 
creators, and they are unlikely to suffer the same poor contractual terms offered to 
newcomers in weak bargaining positions.72 
Alternatively, the internet via direct distribution platforms such as YouTube, Spotify and 
SoundCloud could be used by creators to establish themselves and to show that there is a 
market for their music which may improve their bargaining positions, as that creator now 
presents a smaller risk of financial failure. This strategy would avoid the issue of music 
creators having to go through the record company ‘gatekeepers’ for access to the public; 
while record companies remain to some extent gatekeepers of traditional media, their 
intermediary role is reduced online.73 However, using the internet as an exposure or direct 
distribution tool has its own problems. As the internet has practically no barriers to entry for 
music creators competition for an audience is high and many musicians will never be heard. 
For example, there are approximately 4 million songs on Spotify which have never been 
listened to,74 leading to the creation of “Forgotify” which gives access to those songs.75 Even 
Justin Bieber and Adele, who were discovered online and signed contracts with music 
companies, as examples, this is unlikely to be a strategy guaranteed to secure substantial 
exposure.76 Even the music creators who do find exposure this way may only slightly 
mitigate their poor bargaining positions. Thus, while some music creators may be able to 
utilise the internet to improve their bargaining positions or circumvent music companies 
altogether, these benefits will not be obtained by the majority of musicians, leaving the 
question of revenue distribution in a place of central importance.  
As acknowledged, there are winners in this system; the incredibly successful musicians also 
tend to receive better contractual terms, such as higher royalty entitlements.77 However, most 
musicians do not belong to this incredibly successful elite and “while a small number of 
                                                          
70  Karubian, above n 37 at 396. 
71  Towse, above n 46 at 378. 
72  Towse, above n 46 at 388 and Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 64. 
73  Kretchmer and others, above n 49 at 66 and Karubian, above n 37 at 396. 
74  Spotify “It’s Spotify’s 5th Birthday Today!” (7 October 2013) Spotify <www.news.spotify.com>   
75  <www.forgotify.com>  
76  Michael Keshen “9 musicians who got discovered on the internet” (4 December 2014) Hover 
<www.hover.com> and Desiree Adib “ Pop star Justin Bieber is on the brink of superstardom” (14 
November 2014) ABC news <www.abcnews.go.com>  
77  Towse, above n 26 at 69. 
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creators are multi-millionaires, most are not making a living through creative work”.78 
Additionally, not all copyright contracts necessarily contain an inefficient distribution of 
revenue. But the weak bargaining position of newcomer music creators is not altered by the 
existence of some fair or efficient contracts and, as noted above, an economic analysis of 
typical royalty distributions in copyright contracts has suggested that they are inefficient.79 
The inefficient allocation of music revenue, while not absolute, is sufficiently prevalent to 
call for a consideration of regulatory intervention.  
All of this does not lead to the conclusion that all music creators deserve payment by virtue 
of being music creators (although that is a conclusion that some may wish to draw). If the 
music that they create unpopular and is not purchased by consumers then this paper is not 
arguing that the state should provide them with income. Instead, it argues that within the 
context of copyright law, music creators who produce music which is popular and therefore 
purchased by consumers should be entitled to fair remuneration for their creation. As it 
stands, that remuneration is often not provided. This is due to the weak bargaining positions 
of most music creators compared to music companies, which is premised on the difficulty of 
entering the music industry as a newcomer.80 As a result, the incentive, or even the ability, to 
produce music is diminished as potential music creators may choose more financially 
rewarding careers, or simply not have time to create music and support themselves. 
Consequently, there is an allocative inefficiency and a prima facie case for the state to 
intervene. 
From the discussion above it is apparent that even from a strictly economic perspective it is 
doubtful that many of the current copyright contracts which distribute the revenues are 
efficient. Moreover, once the substantive aim of incentivising the production of music in the 
public interest is considered alongside the purely economic allocative efficiency approach it 
becomes clear that the distribution of revenue between music creators and companies should 
be considered from a regulatory standpoint.  
If this approach is doubted, I engage in an alternative, yet complementary, justification based 
on the substantive fairness of regulated remuneration for music creators below.  
3 Substantive political approach 
The substantive political approach to the public interest theory of regulation goes further than 
welfare economics analyses. It incorporates substantive values, such as social justice, 
redistribution and paternalism into the assessment of what justifies regulation.81 It is argued 
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81  Morgan and Yeung, above n 21 at 26. 
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that these non-economic goals are sufficient basis for regulatory intervention.82 Public-
interested redistribution and collective desires and aspirations are particularly relevant when 
considering the music industry.83  
Public-interested redistribution is, somewhat self-explanatorily, the redistribution of 
resources from one group to another, by the state, in the public interest.84 The state has the 
power to do this by virtue of being the state, so long as Parliament has passed laws 
accordingly. However, the ability to do something does not justify doing it. Thus, the ‘public 
interest’ aspect of the regulation must be defensible. I argue that in the case of the music 
industry, music creators are in an analogous position to labourers prior to minimum wage 
laws, a group which is easily defended as having a legitimate claim to the resources.85 
Sunstein describes statutory protection of workers as an effort to overcome “the difficulties of 
organisation of many people in the employment market”.86 He describes a situation where 
workers prefer 9 hour days to 12 hour days, but prefer 12 hour days to no work at all. In an 
unregulated market the workers will compete to their collective disadvantage: due to fear that 
if they refuse to work 12 hour days, other workers (who are willing to work such long days) 
will be hired to do the work and they will be unemployed.87 This is analogous to music 
creators who are competing to enter contracts with record companies and so are in a poor 
bargaining position regarding payment. While this situation would not arise if labour was 
scarce, there are many more musicians trying to become successful than there are record 
labels willing to sign them and so there is a power imbalance in favour of the companies.88  
Simply giving music creators copyright in their works is not enough, because they may trade 
or licence the copyright which simply causes the collective action problem, described above, 
to rematerialise. Sunstein says the same of labourers, explaining that rights conferred by 
regulatory statutes must be inalienable, otherwise they will simply be traded and the problem 
will not be resolved.89 He goes on to say that this kind of analysis helps to justify minimum 
wage and fair labour legislation generally, though he notes that the distributional 
consequences are complex and there will be many losers even within the group which is the 
target of the regulatory aid.90  
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Public-interested redistribution can therefore be used as a rationale for regulating to provide 
music creators with fair remuneration, on the basis that as a group they are unable to obtain it 
without regulatory intervention due to their individually weak bargaining positions and 
internal competition. Collective desires and aspirations are also relevant in this discussion. 
The basic premise of this rationale is that the choices that people make as consumers are 
sometimes different from those they make as political participants; “democracy thus calls for 
an intrusion on markets”.91 For example, a consumer may wish to buy the cheapest T-shirt 
available, but may also be politically opposed to child labour and sweatshops. Regulating 
against the latter will cause the price of the T-shirt to increase, in opposition to the 
individual’s consumer preferences, but consistently with their political ideals.  
Sunstein offers, in explanation for the difference in preferences, the fact that there are a 
variety of influences distinct to politics which do not have an effect on consumer choices.92 
These include seeking to fulfil aspirations in political behaviour, but not in consumption; 
attempting to satisfy altruistic desires, which diverge from self-interested market preferences; 
acting on meta-preferences, or “wishes about their wishes”, and; using political choice as a 
way to pre-commit themselves to a course of action they consider to be in the general 
interest.93 It must be noted that it would go too far to make a generalisation about political 
preferences and consumer preferences always being identical or always being distinct.94 
Instead, they are best viewed as two arenas in which preferences may overlap, but which 
have considerations and influences on the individual unique to them. 
Under this analysis, government action to ensure fair remuneration for music creators may be 
viewed as the expression of collective desires regarding fairness, the need to provide an 
incentive for music creation, a dislike of the power imbalance that favours record companies 
or really any individual reasoning that supports fair remuneration. A criticism here is that, 
despite the government having a democratic mandate, the public may not actually be in 
support of this particular regulatory response. They may prefer affordable music and may fear 
that the price will increase, or they may simply feel that it is not required. The response to 
this is that the government is democratically accountable, and will face consequences for 
their action at the ballot box.  
B Goals of Regulation 
Following from the justifications for regulatory action outlined above, the goal of any 
regulation suggested by this paper is to ensure fair remuneration for music creators. This is 
derived from the justifications of copyright, which understands itself as providing a financial 
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(Martin Kretchmer and others The Relationship Between Copyright and Contract Law (2010) at 1) 
incentive for creators, and the market failure inherent in the current relationships between 
creators and the music industry, and the substantive political goal of ‘fairness’. 
Many of the groups which support the strengthening of copyright law, do so purportedly on 
the same basis that I have just outlined, increasing artist remuneration. They believe that 
creators would be paid more ‘if the pie was bigger’. This paper instead focuses on ‘how the 
pie is cut’ (distribution of revenue) as that issue is more practically open to regulation than 
the issue of online copyright infringement. This is because detection is difficult in the 
anonymous realm of the internet and the widespread and often small scale nature of 
infringement makes enforcement mechanisms costly and slow.95 Any regulation in this area 
would have to be ‘future-proofed’ to remain functional in the wake of constant technological 
advancements. In contrast, regulating contractual relationships between music businesses and 
creators is more feasible as businesses are not anonymous and retain copies of contracts and 
financial records. Additionally, while increased revenue from copyrights generally would 
result in creators having a higher total income, they would still be proportionately 
disadvantaged to music companies. Thus the allocative inefficiency and substantive 
unfairness would still exist, and the financial incentive to the creator would be smaller than 
was either fair or efficient.  
The image below illustrates the various contracts by which copyrights can be governed. The 
regulatory target in this paper is the ‘exploitation contracts’ between the copyright holders 
and intermediaries.  
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C Evidence Based regulating 
One of the more recent criticisms about copyright reform has been the lack of evidence based 
legislation. The recording industry has repeatedly called for stronger copyright laws, warning 
that musicians are suffering as a result of piracy and increased protections will help.96 The 
extent to which this is true is questionable, largely because very little evidence has been 
offered to support the argument, nor the laws that are enacted in reliance upon it.97  
There have been various recent reports about the necessity of evidence as an integral part of 
the copyright reform process. The Gowers review in 2006 relied strongly on evidence to 
analyse policy judgements,98 the Social Science Research Council noted in 2011 that they 
saw “a serious and increasingly sophisticated industry research enterprise embedded in a 
lobbying effort with a historically very loose relationship to evidence”,99 and the Hargreaves 
review in the United Kingdom urged the Government “to ensure that in future, policy on 
Intellectual Property issues is constructed on the basis of evidence, rather than the weight of 
lobbying”.100 Thus this paper proceeds on the basis that evidence is at the minimum 
desirable, if not strictly required as a matter of law, in the regulation process, and that where 
possible it should be referred to by policymakers.  
IV Analysis of regulatory solutions 
This paper now turns to the potential regulation of the problems with the relationship between 
music creators and music businesses described above. Shleifer describes different strategies 
for control of businesses, each of which demonstrates the “ever growing powers of the state 
vis-à-vis private individuals”.101 They are: market discipline, private litigation, public 
enforcement via regulation, and state ownership.102 The Fair Trade Music scheme arguably 
falls within market discipline, helped by state facilitation, as it regulates via social norms and 
the market. The suggested regulation of copyright contracts falls within public enforcement 
via regulation. 
                                                          
96  Klein, Moss and Edwards, above n 21 at 65. 
97  Patry, above n 41 at 11 and 50. 
98  Andrew Gowers Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 
2006) at 5. 
99  Social Science Research Council Media Piracy in Emerging Economies (Social Science Research Council, 
USA, 2011) at 4. 
100  Ian Hargreaves Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and Growth (Independent Report 
for the Government of the United Kingdom, May 2011) at 1. 
101  Andrei Schleifer “Understanding Regulation” (2005) 11(4) Europ. Finan. Manage. 439 at 442. 
102  Andrei Schleifer, above n 101 at 442. 
19 
 
A Fair Trade Music 
1 Introduction 
Voluntary disclosure regimes, such as Fairtrade certification, are becoming more 
prevalent.103 Within a capitalist economy the rising consumer awareness about the ethical 
implications of production processes creates an incentive for producers to disclose 
information about ethical production in order to attract consumers.104 Fair Trade Music 
(FTM) is modelled after the Fairtrade Coffee movement, and aims to give music consumers a 
clear choice between music which has been produced ensuring the fair compensation of all 
parties involved and music which has not.105 It requires each link in the distribution chain to 
operate ethically, according to standards set by a certification body.106 This would result in a 
clear indication of “which digital streaming and other music services operate in a fair, 
transparent and ethical way”.107 A certification body would determine whether music 
distributors are FTM compliant.108  
Successful implementation of this regulatory certification scheme would require consumer 
belief that ethical music was more desirable; leading to increased purchases, which in turn 
creates a competitive incentive for music distribution businesses to become certified. In this 
way social norms regulate consumer behaviour which leads to the market regulating business 
behaviour. 
Various obstacles must be overcome for this idealised model to become reality. This paper 
first argues that the social norms that would act on consumers need to be shown either to 
exist, or to be inducible, and any attitude-behaviour gap between those norms and actual 
consumer purchasing decisions would need to be addressed.109 Administration of the scheme 
would need to be established; this paper discusses why government establishment of 
independent administration would be beneficial. Standards would need to be set via the 
selection of certification criteria, and would need to be clearly communicated to consumers. 
Businesses tend to be self-interested, so inducing initial members of the scheme to become 
certified may pose a challenge. A cost benefit analysis of the proposed regulation would be 
beneficial to assess effectiveness. Finally, the issues of monitoring compliance and 
enforcement are addressed, as are difficulties which may arise from the political context.  
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2 Social norms 
A preliminary question which must be satisfied is whether regulatory schemes which use 
social norms to influence consumer behaviour can be effective. The copyright industry 
already has a history of using social norms to attempt to influence consumer behaviour.110 
They have done this by campaigns that cast infringement in harsh terms, as a criminal activity 
or as damaging to the cultural industries,111 as well as a softer approach which emphasises a 
partnership between the producers and consumers, where the consumers are responsible for 
keeping the creative industries alive.112  
The FTM scheme depends on positive attitudes toward music creators and consumer 
engagement with the concept in order to be successful. In general, ethical consumption, 
defined as “the purchase of a product that concerns a certain ethical issue and is chosen freely 
by an individual consumer”, is on the rise.113 More specifically, studies have indicated that 
the majority of consumers are willing to pay more for music that is licenced from the 
copyright holder (and thus legal), and that they prefer the extra revenue to go to songwriters 
and musicians.114 This indicates that consumers have a positive attitude towards fair 
compensation for music creators. Further support for such an attitude may come from the 
notoriety of the Fairtrade certification mark, the presence of which may have created fertile 
ground for the extension of a social norm about fair compensation for commodities producers 
to be extended to music creators.115 However, a study evaluating this empirically would be 
desirable before implementing an FTM scheme on the basis of this attitude.  
One of the possible effects of having a certification scheme for ‘ethical’ music, particularly 
one which was government sanctioned, is it may take on a normative role and begin to shape 
consumer expectations concerning music production. This provides an alternative to the 
requirement of a positive social attitude towards fair compensation for music creators, and 
instead gives support to the idea that such an attitude could be formed by the regulation (in 
part at least) rather than being a prerequisite to it. This is further supported by the important 
role of marketing in any certification scheme.116  
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Companies which engage in ethical practices are not growing at a rate proportionate to the 
documented rise in ethical consumerism.117 Various studies have proposed that this is due to 
an ‘attitude-behaviour gap’ which is where attitudes towards something do not translate into 
the expected behaviour.118 This means that even if consumers do have a positive attitude 
towards fair compensation for artists, this may not lead to them choosing an FTM certified 
music provider over another option.  
The main reason this disconnect between attitude and behaviour exists is that a positive 
attitude toward a more ethical product is only one factor considered when making a 
purchasing decision.119 Consumer purchasing decisions often incorporate a complex variety 
of motivations which may outweigh specific attitudes.120 The most common of these 
motivations are convenience, habit, value for money and individual responses to social and 
institutional norms.121 These practices are likely to be resistant to change.122  
Therefore, prior to implementing an FTM certification scheme empirical studies showing that 
positive attitudes towards fair remuneration for artists will actually translate into consumers 
choosing FTM certified businesses over non-certified options would need to be undertaken. 
However, a contrary conclusion is not necessarily the nail in the coffin for FTM. Studies have 
indicated that targeted marketing strategies could help to improve the conversion rate from 
‘attitude’ to ‘behaviour’.123 For example, a study looking at attitudes and behavioural 
intention regarding sustainable food found that consumers with high personal involvement 
(those who were more aware of the benefits of sustainable consumption) were more likely to 
have a positive attitude towards, and to purchase, sustainable products.124 The study also 
found that belief in their personal consumer effectiveness, the perceived availability of a 
product, and certainty about the sustainability claims made in relation to the product all 
contributed to an increased likelihood of purchasing the product,125 and that these were able 
to be influenced by communication of relevant information.126  
                                                          
117  De Palsmacker, Driesen and Rayp, above n 113 at 2: They often had market shares of less than 1% as 
at 2000. 
118  Iris Vermeir and Wim Verbeke “Sustainable Food Consumption: Exploring the Consumer “Attitude-
Behavioral Intention” Gap” (2006) 19 J. Agr. Environ. Ethic 169 at 170 and De Palsmacker, Driesen and 
Rayp, above n 113. 
119  Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 173. 
120  Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 173. 
121  Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 170. 
122  Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 170. 
123  Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 185-186. 
124   Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 184. 
125  Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 184-185: Personal consumer effectiveness is the belief that the 
individual consumer’s purchasing decisions can have an impact on the social issue. 
126  Vermier and Verbeke, above n 118 at 188. 
22 
 
Additionally, many music distribution services offer similar and expansive music catalogues. 
If the majority of a consumer’s music preferences are available on two services then the 
ethics of those services may become the distinguishing factor. It is thus entirely plausible that 
even if an attitude-behaviour gap is found in consumer decision making regarding FTM-
certified music, this could be overcome by a targeted marketing campaign.  
There are other concerns regarding FTM that may affect consumer decision making, such as 
a price premium attaching to FTM-certified services or comparatively reduced availability of 
FTM certified music. The first of these concerns is due to the concern that meeting FTM 
standards of fair compensation for music creators is likely to increase the operating costs for 
a music distribution company, which may result in the costs being passed on to end 
consumers as a price premium.127 The second concern arises from the difficulties in obtaining 
stakeholder participation. If the major stakeholders are not on board with the FTM 
certification scheme then music which is certified as ‘ethical’ may be predominantly non-
mainstream, leading to a comparatively low quantity and variety in the music available to 
ethical consumers. As each of these possibilities is a constituent of a larger issue around the 
implementation of an FTM scheme, I will discuss them in that context below.  
3 Administration and structure  
The issue of who would actually implement an FTM scheme and fulfil the certification 
function also needs to be addressed. The FTM scheme proposed by Eddie Schwartz envisions 
an independent certification body which would administer the scheme, and which would 
include music creators among its constituents.128 However, this paper’s focus is on 
governmental establishment of regulatory standards, so it proposes implementation of an 
FTM scheme by the New Zealand Government, rather than a third party or industry-based 
body.  
The Trade Marks Act 2002 requires that certification of goods is undertaken by an 
independent body which does not trade in the goods.129 An independent government entity, 
such as the Copyright Tribunal, could undertake this role. The benefit of this is that the entity 
could be constituted of people who have expertise in the relevant areas, such as copyright and 
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economics.130 The entity chosen or created would need to have sufficient resources available, 
so if the Copyright Tribunal were chosen it would need to be expanded.  
Generally speaking, the New Zealand Government possesses certain competencies that would 
allow it to successfully establish and help resource an FTM scheme which could then be 
managed by an independent regulatory body. Abbott and Snidal identify five stages of 
regulatory standard setting and four competencies required to regulate.131 They outline the 
five stages as, chronologically, placing an issue on the political agenda, negotiating the 
standards, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.132 The four essential competencies 
are independence, representativeness, expertise and operational capacity.133  This paper 
proposes that the government places the regulation on the political agenda, but leaves the 
negotiation of standards, implementation, monitoring and enforcement to an independent 
regulatory body.  
The regulatory body could rely on the state’s “strong operational capacity, including [its] 
substantial resources, legal authority, and strong legislative and administrative procedures, 
inspection systems and enforcement processes” to ensure it is strong and well-resourced.134 
Regarding representativeness, democratic states like New Zealand implicitly represent a 
broad range of interests and are generally accountable via the electoral process.135 
Furthermore, a regulatory body would be advised to engage in a standard setting process that 
incorporated the relevant stakeholders, discussed further below. Finally, an independent 
public body could be subject to judicial review if its independence in decision-making was 
doubted. 
Apart from the requirement in the Trade Mark Act for independence of certificatory bodies, 
mentioned above, the consequences of insufficient independence were highlighted in Graber 
and Lai’s analysis of the Australian Authenticity label. Lack of independence in the 
certification body, which also owned the mark and set the standards, was found to have 
contributed to the scheme’s early failure.136 As a comparison, the Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisation International (FLO) sets the standards collaboratively with producers, but an 
independent body called FLOCERT actually carries out the audit and certification 
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functions.137 While a Crown entity-type regulatory body would be independent of the 
industry it regulated, it should be considered whether, within government resource 
constraints, the certificatory and standard-setting functions of the body could operate 
independently. 
Additionally, lack of financial sustainability and accountability has been attributed to the 
failure of the Australian Authenticity label. Adequate finances allow for marketing and 
consumer education which is crucial to the success of ethical certification schemes.138 The 
importance of marketing has already been discussed in the social norm section above, 
however, this analysis of other certification schemes emphasises the need for sufficient 
resources to successfully implement the scheme. These could be obtained from the state if it 
made FTM an important regulatory goal, and the certification body could contribute by 
charging its auditing and certification processes to the applicants, as FLOCERT does. 139 
The New Zealand Government can learn from international examples of successful 
certification systems. Through the establishment of an independent regulatory body which 
negotiates with stakeholders it is capable of creating a competent and successful system.  
Additionally, New Zealand does not have a strong domestic lobbying presence and so the 
state may be more willing to regulate the music creator-music distributor relationship than its 
counterparts in the United States, for example. 
4 Certification criteria and labelling  
The proposed FTM certification scheme is a form of standard-setting regulation. The FTM 
principles that have been suggested by the Global Advocacy Network of music creators are: 
fair compensation for music creators, transparent management of rights and revenues, an 
option for music creators to recapture their rights after a period of time, independent music 
creator organisations which  advocate for, educate and provide support to members of the 
music creator community, and freedom of speech.140  
While it is outside the scope of this paper to propose specific criteria of an FTM certification 
scheme, as those should be negotiated by stakeholders, I will discuss the process of selecting 
the criteria. The certification criteria must be formulated with interests of consumers, music 
creators and the music industry in mind. In order to be effective they must balance the 
interests of the record industry in making a profit with the regulatory goal of fair 
compensation for music creators, while meeting consumer expectations of fair compensation. 
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Failing to achieve this balance could result in music company refusal to participate in the 
scheme, failure to achieve the goal of fair compensation for music creators, or lack of public 
engagement in the scheme which may exacerbate either of the other risks.  
As the analysis of the failure of the Australian Authenticity label scheme points out, 
“stakeholder involvement is an important element of Fairtrade standards”.141 A similar 
standard setting process to the Fairtrade model, which is open and involves all major 
stakeholders, would be desirable in the FTM scheme.142 It would also be in line with the 
ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards.143 Major 
stakeholder involvement in the construction of FTM standards would act to ameliorate 
stakeholder reluctance. 
The label adopted by an FTM certification scheme to signify compliance with its standards 
should be chosen by the administering body. Certification marks are available in New 
Zealand under the Trades Mark Act, which is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.144 Using 
some version of ‘Fair Trade Music’ as a certification mark may pose a problem due to the 
similarity to the FAIRTRADE certification mark owned by FLO. This issue arises because s 
25 of the Trade Marks Act prevents registration of marks which are either identical or 
confusingly similar to already registered marks, where the marks in question relate to the 
same or similar goods or services. This similarity may not be fatal to ‘Fair Trade Music’ as a 
certification mark however, because the ‘device’ or visual image that accompanies the FTM 
mark could be made quite distinct from the one accompanying the FAIRTRADE mark, 
lessening consumer confusion. Additionally, regarding the goods and services to which the 
marks relate, the certification of commodities which is undertaken by FLO is different to the 
certification of music proposed under the FTM system. Ultimately, the ‘Fair Trade Music’ 
certification mark may be registered where the Examiner is satisfied that there is “no real 
likelihood of confusion or deception resulting from the registration and use of the mark”.145  
An application for use of the FAIRTRADE certification mark owned by FLO for certifying 
music is unlikely to be successful. FLO aims to help farmers in developing countries 
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exclusively, and the system is intended for commodities.146 Extending the FLO certification 
system to music would be inappropriate due to both the majority of the potential stakeholders 
being located in developed countries and the intangible and non-commodity nature of 
produced music.  
Once a certification mark is chosen, there are other requirements that it must meet under the 
Trade Marks Act. These include a clear indication to consumers that it is a certification mark, 
and evidence of the competency of the applicant to certify only goods which possess the 
required characteristics and to prevent to misuse of the mark.147 Additionally, the significance 
of the FTM mark must be communicated to consumers. If ‘Fair Trade Music’ is adopted as 
the mark, then public familiarity with the principles of the Fair Trade movement may go 
some way to achieve this. Indeed, the goodwill garnered by the FAIRTRADE mark may help 
to engender a positive perception of the mark among consumers. Conversely, there is a risk 
that the comparison of the FLO system which supports exploited farmers in developing 
countries with the FTM system which is designed to ensure sufficient pay of musicians 
primarily in developed countries might lead consumers to view the FTM arrangement 
negatively, as less virtuous than ‘Fairtrade’. Nonetheless, the specific characteristics denoted 
by the FTM mark will need to be conveyed via marketing campaigns to raise awareness of 
the label among consumers.  A marketing campaign of this sort will be costly but it will allow 
the system to accrue goodwill which will contribute to its overall success,148 and will allow 
consumers to have confidence that the music, or music service, they are purchasing is 
consistent with their values.149 
5 Initial stakeholder participation 
A key obstacle to be overcome for the success of an FTM certification scheme is stakeholder 
participation. Consumer engagement with the scheme, while necessary, is not sufficient for a 
successful operation. I propose two possible forms of stakeholder involvement to achieve a 
successful regulatory scheme.  
In the first instance, stakeholders with a large market share or who provide a large variety of 
music to consumers may choose not to become involved in an FTM scheme. This may be due 
to a sense of security in the current business model and undertaking the kind of major 
changes that may be required to become FTM compliant could be viewed as risky. This is an 
even greater concern for businesses which provide a large variety of music to consumers, as 
they would be required to negotiate with all of the relevant rights holders in order to ensure 
FTM compliance; a process which may be time consuming and ultimately fruitless. Firms are 
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“by law and culture focused on profits”.150 If this scenario occurs, the success of the scheme 
will depend on smaller stakeholders becoming certified and raising awareness of FTM among 
consumers. In turn, this will shine a spotlight on larger businesses and pressure them to 
become compliant. This occurred to some extent with Starbucks initial refusal to offer 
Fairtrade coffee in its American stores: Starbucks eventually participated in the certification 
scheme after it faced pressure from consumer advocacy groups.151 Firms which provide 
branded products, which includes most music services distributing music to end consumers, 
are more vulnerable to non-government organisation and public pressure than those 
producing intermediate goods.152 This is because they are more visible to end users and so 
can be targeted by publicity campaigns. Thus participation in an FTM certification scheme 
would grow gradually.  
In the second possible scenario, larger stakeholders participate in the scheme from its 
inception. Due to concerns described above, these stakeholders may be hesitant to engage 
with an unproven scheme. Consequently, including key stakeholders in the formulation of the 
regulation, particularly in standard setting, may be essential to attaining initial participation of 
larger stakeholders.153 Businesses are not inherently opposed to all regulation, in fact, 
businesses in the creative industries depend on copyright laws which allow them to exploit 
property.154 Instead, businesses are concerned with the specific content of regulation.155 
Allowing companies to help formulate standards allows them, inter alia, to ensure more 
business-friendly rules and to minimise compliance costs.156 Ultimately, businesses exist in a 
competitive environment which shapes their attitudes and concerns. They will avoid costs 
unless there is a visible competitive benefit associated with them.157 All firms will be more 
open to standard setting regulation when their competitors also participate, which is why 
including them in the regulatory process is important.158 A particular assistance to obtaining 
industry-wide stakeholder participation would be key businesses or industry associations 
which play a leadership role becoming involved in the FTM system.159 This could create an 
industry norm around FTM participation. Another relevant consideration is that businesses 
may actually prefer to comply with voluntary standards because they feel it discourages 
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governments from mandatory standards, such as regulation of the business-creator 
relationship discussed later in this paper.160 
To achieve an effective regulatory scheme, eventually key stakeholders will need to 
participate. This is because they represent the largest number of music creators and so 
without their involvement the regulatory goal will be frustrated.  
An ancillary effect of a functional FTM system is that in order for music businesses to 
become certified in New Zealand, they may by proxy also comply with FTM standards in 
their global operations. This is because global businesses such as Spotify or Apple Music 
provide the same music internationally and if that music is made FTM compliant for New 
Zealand, it will likely remain FTM compliant in all other countries where it is distributed. 
The extensiveness of the required changes to international businesses may create an incentive 
not to engage with FTM, particularly as New Zealand is a comparatively small market within 
the global sphere, providing little incentive in the form of a consumer increase. 
However, the competitive advantages that come from being branded an ‘ethical music 
provider’ in New Zealand will apply equally overseas. Companies certified in New Zealand 
could market themselves as ‘Fair Trade Music’ in other countries and so gain a competitive 
advantage with more than just New Zealand consumers in the New Zealand market. Whether 
this advantage would outweigh the costs associated in becoming compliant is unclear. 
Smaller companies may wish to distinguish themselves from larger companies in overseas 
markets this way. As most music distribution services have a similar selection of music 
available competition on the quality of the experience is key, FTM could be a deciding factor 
in attracting ethical consumers to a particular distributor. Additionally, a recording business 
would not need to change its entire system of revenue distribution to become FTM compliant, 
it would simply have to ensure that revenue from an FTM certified source was distributed 
according to FTM standards.  This may lower initial barriers to entry and allow for gradual 
uptake of the scheme, making it more attractive to distribution companies wishing to avoid 
difficulties with record companies. 
Music distributors are not the only stakeholders in a FTM certification scheme. The music 
creators themselves will also be impacted by the successful adoption of a certification system. 
Some music creators, such as the group championing the current non-governmental FTM 
proposal, may be pleased with an FTM option and join certified businesses with alacrity. But 
this attitude will not necessarily be true of all artists. A negative attitude towards the scheme 
could exist for a number of reasons. For example, music creators may feel that demanding 
higher remuneration, such as one specified by an FTM standard, makes them less likely to be 
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signed by record labels, so less likely to be successful. They may be ideologically opposed to 
regulatory schemes being applied to the music industry, or a variety of other personal 
reasons. However, many music creators have spoken out and said they want fair 
remuneration so it appears that engaging music creators as stakeholders in an FTM system 
will not pose the same difficulties as music businesses.161 
6 Cost-benefit analysis 
Cost-benefit analyses (CBA) can be used to improve the quality of public policy decisions, 
such as whether to promulgate new regulations.162 A CBS should be undertaken as part of the 
decision making process regarding FTM. Benefits include transparency, increased 
accountability, comparison of different policies and highlighting inadequacies in 
information.163 However, an inherent limitation is that they quantify everything in economic 
terms which may overlook substantive goals behind regulation.164 
A cost-benefit analysis of an FTM certification scheme would need to quantify and attach 
monetary values to, inter alia, the expected increase in income for music creators, including 
estimates of the likely consumer base of FTM-certified businesses and the number of 
business which would become certified. The cost of implementing and maintaining the 
scheme would also need to be considered, including promotion required to encourage 
consumers to use FTM-certified schemes.  
A full discussion of cost-benefit analyses in this context is both outside the scope of this 
paper and the expertise of the author, so will not be undertaken. It should be noted that a cost-
benefit analysis is only one aspect of regulatory decision making.  
7 Monitoring compliance and enforcement 
The enforcement of a certification scheme, as with any regulatory scheme, is paramount to its 
success. In the case of FTM the primary issue likely to arise is detecting or preventing 
improper use of the ‘Fair Trade Music’ label by a business which does not meet the 
certification criteria. If FTM certification proves to be a factor in consumer decision making, 
there will be an incentive for music distribution businesses to market themselves as FTM 
compliant. However, FTM certification will likely require changes at many rungs of the 
distributional ladderchanges which are under the control of other parties. For example, 
Spotify may wish to obtain the benefit of FTM certification but would need to ensure that not 
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only does it fairly remunerate the rights holders, but that they fairly distribute that 
remuneration so that the music creator receives fair compensation for their work. This may be 
difficult, costly and time consuming, particularly as it would likely require renegotiation or 
creation of new contracts and only some key players may be on board. Aggregate distributors 
like Spotify, could overcome the latter issue by marketing only specific music as being FTM 
compliant, but this may open the door to gaming by aggregate distributors marketing 
themselves generally as FTM compliant despite having little music that is actually compliant. 
Alternatively, some businesses may simply decide to access the benefits of the FTM label 
without going through the trouble of getting certified. To ensure that the label is not 
fraudulently used it can be registered as a certification mark which is a sign that signifies a 
particular characteristic of the product to which it is attached.165 
This premise raises a few issues: detecting improper uses of FTM certification; creative 
labelling, and; how to enforce the scheme once improper use has been detected. Regarding 
the first of these, some sort of monitoring system would have to be effected by the agency in 
charge of FTM implementation. Businesses keep accounts of payments and revenue so 
theoretically information gathering should be simple, however, music companies may be 
reluctant to disclose financial information.  
Creative labelling, the second concern, refers to companies claiming the benefits of 
consumers believing they are FTM-certified, without actually obtaining or explicitly claiming 
the certification. For example, Costa Coffee in the United Kingdom displayed “Fair Trade” 
prominently on its website in 2011, despite not being “Fairtrade” certified.166 Creative 
labelling can be dealt with under the Fair Trading Act 1986, to the extent that it is deceptive 
or misleading.167  
The third concern, enforcement, has various possible solutions. If a company obtains 
certification and is then discovered to no longer be compliant, revocation of their FTM-
certification is an obvious step. However, companies who falsely obtain the benefit of FTM-
certification either through creative labelling or simply improperly claiming certification will 
require additional enforcement action, to discourage this kind of behaviour. A logical 
corollary of companies falsely claiming certification because of the competitive incentive is 
that publicly naming the company as falsely claiming the certification will damage its 
reputation, and consumers who chose that company because of its ethical status will cease 
their custom. The effectiveness of this enforcement technique will depend on whether 
consumers chose that company for its FTM-certification (if not, then the illegitimacy of the 
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FTM claim is unlikely to affect their consumption habits) and whether the agency in charge 
of FTM is able to effectively communicate the deceit to consumers.  
Companies that misrepresent their compliance with certification standards may also be able 
to be sued for false advertising. The Fair Trading Act generally prohibits misleading and 
deceptive conduct in trade,168 and specifically states that false representations about the 
affiliation or endorsement of products are prohibited,169 as is false use of a trademark 
(including certification marks).170 Section 3 of the Act states that it applies to conduct that 
occurs outside of New Zealand to the extent that it relates to trade within New Zealand.  
Fines may also be imposed as a sanction for falsely claiming compliance with the scheme. 
However, the inclusion of fines within the regulatory scheme may act as a deterrent to 
potential members. Companies may be concerned that they will be fined for failing to comply 
where their failure was in good faith, exposing themselves to pecuniary risk with no 
guarantee of a reward.   
8 Political context 
The proposed FTM certification scheme would be voluntary rather than mandatory which 
would go some way to averting political fallout. Though it would still involve the 
government publicly championing the interests of one group (music creators), however 
reasonably, in a context where there are various perspectives to consider. This is likely to 
cause opposition to the scheme, most likely from music industry incumbents. The most 
important political considerations in this context are likely to be international. This is partly 
because New Zealand is in the process of negotiating a trade deal which is predicted to result 
in more protective copyright laws,171 and partly because New Zealand is a small market in 
the global behemoth that is the music industryan industry which is known for its 
protectionist lobbying.172 It follows that the government may face pressure to maintain the 
status quo with regards to music creator compensation.  
9 International obligations 
The World Trade Organisation has various treaties to which New Zealand is a party. The 
FTM scheme, while domestic regulation, could apply to both national and international 
businesses. Thus it would need to be consistent with New Zealand’s international trade 
obligation, including the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  
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The GATT sets out requirements for non-discrimination in trade. Specifically, Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment and National Treatment. Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 
requires that any advantage granted by a contracting party to a product originating in, or 
destined for, another country shall be accorded to like products originating in, or destined for, 
all other contracting parties.173 National Treatment requires that goods that have entered a 
market are treated no less favourably than like products of national origin.174 There is no 
indication that a voluntary FTM certification scheme would not be consistent with either of 
these obligations as it does not distinguish music based on country of origin.175  
The TBT covers voluntary certification schemes. Such schemes are ‘standards’ under the 
Agreement.176  While it require states to adopt international standards where they already 
exist, there is no evidence of an international standard regarding fair trade certification of 
music.177 The initiative by the Global Advocacy Group of music creators is unlikely to be 
considered to have become an international standard. Labelling procedures should also follow 
Articles 5-9 of the TBT, one of the requirements of which is for a complaints process to 
exist.178  
To summarise, there is nothing to indicate that a voluntary certification scheme, such as 
FTM, would not be consistent with the GATT or TBT agreements.179 The TBT may impose 
some obligations on the standard-setting body which should be complied with. 
10 Conclusion on FTM certification 
While there are many practical hurdles that need to be surpassed prior to implementation, 
there is a reasonable argument that FTM certification could be successfully adopted within 
New Zealand. Stakeholder involvement and strategic marketing to consumers are two of the 
most important factors to successful execution. Without engaging both groups, the scheme is 
unlikely to effectively achieve its goal of increased creator remuneration.  
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B Regulating contractual relationships within the music industry 
1 Introduction 
The second proposed regulatory intervention is one which regulates the contractual 
relationship between music creators and businesses. The practical action in this instance 
would be akin to the regulation of labour relationships, such as the introduction of minimum 
wage, as mentioned earlier.180 In this scenario it could be a threshold percentage of royalties 
that could not be assigned away, an inability to assign future rights (i.e. rights in a work that 
had not yet been produced), or review by a regulatory or judicial body of the ‘fairness’ of the 
contract.  
This paper proposes regulating the distribution of copyright revenue between creators and 
music companies to ensure a minimum proportion for music creators. The licensing, 
assigning, selling or transferring of copyrights is done through contract, so regulation of 
revenue distribution would target copyright contracts.181 Attempts have been made elsewhere 
to influence copyright contracts, for example by making rights unwaivable or only allowing 
assignment of them to copyright collectives.182 Towse explains that “[e]conomists would not 
recommend making rights unwaivable because that interferes with the transfer of rights to the 
most efficient owner” which is unlikely to be the music creator due to high transaction 
costs.183 Thus legislating a minimum distribution of the copyright revenue acts to protect the 
music creators in weak bargaining positions without interfering with the efficient transfer of 
rights. It would be unlikely to significantly impact artists earning above the threshold because 
they are already in stronger bargaining positions and would continue to be able to negotiate 
higher revenue proportions. 
This is not exactly a ‘minimum wage’ as the creator income would be variable dependent on 
total revenue, but it would work to ameliorate the imbalance of bargaining power between the 
contracting parties in the same way that the minimum wage intends to. “[T]he presumption 
that no coercion exists, a premise fundamental to contract law and the orthodox theory of 
exchange, must be suspended in the case where one party to the exchange can be thought to 
suffer from unmet economic needs”.184 As described above, music creators are in a weaker 
bargaining position than music companies.185 “The existence of a systemic inequality in 
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bargaining power” is one of the key arguments for a justification of minimum wage, and 
applies equally to the proposed minimum proportion of revenue regulation in this section.186 
Benefits attributed to the minimum wage equally extend to the proposed minimum proportion 
of revenue regulation. Freeman describes  four benefits particular to the minimum wage: it 
provides an incentive to work, it is administratively simple, it does not take money from 
government or the public sector and it takes wages and benefits out of competition at the 
bottom of the wage distribution.187 The proposed regulation of copyright contracts also offers 
these benefits. The income that a music creator receives under the copyright contract is 
dependent on the total revenue. Thus the incentive to continue producing music for which 
there is demand remains. This differs from other schemes, such as the award of state grants to 
artists and arts organisations which occurs in the Netherlands, which has been criticised for 
creating “too many artists and not enough good art”.188 The regulation is administratively 
simple as it is a single percentage standard, making compliance simple to determine, although 
issues with this approach will be discussed below.189 Additionally, this kind of minimum 
remuneration standard has a “self-enforcing character: [music creators] paid less than the 
minimum can report violations, minimising the need for a sizeable enforcement agency”, 
although there are issues with this point which will be discussed below.190 The effect of the 
regulation proposed by this paper is to redistribute revenue already being obtained from 
copyrights in the music creator’s favour. It will not remove money from the public sector, 
except to the extent required to implement the regulation. Again, this is in contrast to 
government grants which, for example, provide up to 85% of the income of high arts 
organisations in the Netherlands.191 Finally, establishing a minimum revenue distribution 
removes the collective disadvantage problem often faced by labourers.192 
The Copyright Board of Canada offers an example of a similar regulatory scheme to the one 
suggested in this paper. It is described as “an economic regulatory body empowered to 
establish, either mandatorily, or at the request of an interested party, the royalties to be paid 
for the use of copyrighted works”, when the copyrights are entrusted to a collective-
administration society.193 The Board has statutory and implicit powers, including the power 
to set royalties at a higher rate than has been requested by the collective-administration 
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society.194 The suggested regulation goes further than the Canadian model by proposing 
mandatory minimum revenue distributions in all musical copyright contracts, not only those 
administered by collective management organisations. The goal of the regulation is to ensure 
the fair remuneration of music creators, including those not represented by collective 
management organisations.  
Having discussed some of the benefits of regulating a minimum standard of revenue 
distribution in musical copyright contracts, I now turn to some of the issues inherent in such a 
proposition. Regulating contractual relationships in the music industry is likely to require a 
level of expertise which may be higher than is easily available within government. Thus an 
independent body should be considered for the administration of the regulation. A 
consequence of this regulatory response would be that both companies operating solely 
within New Zealand and those which operate internationally, including within New Zealand 
markets, would need to comply with the regulatory scheme. This raises concerns about the 
legitimacy of the New Zealand government effectively regulating foreign contracts. There are 
also practical issues regarding the potential responses from both the companies and the 
individual creators being regulated, as well as the international community. 
2 Administration 
In New Zealand the Copyright Tribunal is an independent body which is currently 
responsible for hearing disputes about licensing schemes and applications regarding file 
sharing infringements under the Copyright Act 1994.195 Extending its jurisdiction to include 
setting the minimum revenue distribution required in musical copyright contracts, and the 
determination of compliance with this standard, would be more appropriate than direct 
government implement this regulatory scheme.196 Independent regulatory agencies, such as 
the Copyright Tribunal, are more suited to dealing with complex, technical and industry-
specific issues.197  
The Copyright Board of Canada offers an example of the administration of a regulatory 
function of this kind. One of the advantages of this model is the independent research 
undertaken by the Board and its willingness to consider evidence which is not directly 
relevant to the interests of the parties in the dispute, but may instead relate to the broader 
public interest and the operation of the particular market.198 The foundation of the proposed 
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regulatory goal is ensuring financial incentive to secure to creation of music in the public 
interest, thus this consideration of broad evidence would be particularly desirable. As the 
Copyright Tribunal would be setting a standard and then determining compliance, 
consideration of the broader public interest would be more relevant at the standard setting 
stage. Thus the consideration of broad evidence may not be as beneficial in the New Zealand 
case. The Canadian model has also faced criticisms, most of which highlight the delay to get 
a hearing date, and the costs and duration of the proceedings.199 These delays are largely the 
result of inadequate staffing and the large number of parties wishing to be heard.200 
Theoretically, the long hearing times would not be such an issue under the proposed New 
Zealand regulation because the Tribunal would do a simple assessment of a copyright 
contract against the standard set by regulation. However, issues in the setting of that standard 
may undermine the ‘simple’ assessment. I will now discuss these.  
The role of the Copyright Tribunal in setting the minimum share of revenue due to a music 
creator under a copyright contract may pose problems which lengthen the hearing process 
and lead to similar criticisms to those applied to the Canadian model above. As discussed 
earlier, there are various types of copyright contracts which may govern greater or fewer of 
the revenue sources available to a music creator.201  The so-called ‘360 contracts’ which have 
become more popular in recent years get their name from their inclusive nature, which 
encompasses more revenue sources than traditional copyright contracts.202 In 
acknowledgement of the extended control of artist revenue that they impose, their terms 
appear to often set a higher percentage of royalties intended for the music creator.203 This 
poses a problem for the supposedly simple ‘one percentage’ approach proposed by this paper. 
A better approach may be to establish categories of copyright contracts, defined by the 
revenue streams that they govern, which attract different minimum percentages of revenue to 
be awarded to the music creator. This may lead to the problems encountered by the Canadian 
model, such as long durations of hearings, and delays to get a hearing, as parties may contest 
the category into which their contract has been placed. This problem would likely be 
exacerbated by the sheer number of international contracts that would need to be assessed to 
obtain access to the New Zealand market.  This could  be ameliorated by a forward looking 
rather than retrospective application to contracts and an appropriate level of resources and 
government support, although this may be limited by the comparatively small public sector in 
New Zealand, but in any case it should inform the design of the regulatory scheme were it to 
be adopted. 
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3 Enforcement 
One of the biggest issues affecting the success of the proposed regulatory intervention is 
enforcement. The Canadian Copyright Board may mandatorily or by request exercise its 
jurisdiction to set royalties. The proposed regulation could be enforced in a similar way, with 
the Copyright Tribunal assessing contracts spontaneously as well as by request. It could also 
be enforced solely on the basis of complaints from one of the parties (presumably the usually 
creator) or solely on the initiative of the Copyright Tribunal, either by spontaneous ‘audits’ or 
methodical assessment of each contract.  
Practically speaking, the most effective enforcement approach appears to be one similar to 
that of the Canadian Copyright Board. A methodical assessment of each contract would likely 
strain the capacity and resources of the Copyright Tribunal, resulting in long delays and 
ineffective regulation as companies had to wait to enter the New Zealand market, or operated 
here without the required certification of their contracts. On the other hand, assessment of 
contracts exclusively following the complaint of an interested party may encounter problems 
on the same basis as there are currently unfair contracts: imbalance of bargaining power due, 
in large part, to the oversupply of labour. Music creators may be reluctant to complain and 
risk not having their contract renewed, or obtaining a reputation as difficult and struggling to 
find work with other music companies. This is especially pertinent when it is remembered 
that the music creators in the worst bargaining positions, who need the statutory protection, 
are also those who are most disposable to the music companies as they have not yet ‘proven 
themselves’ financially successful.  
The combination of both spontaneous audits and the reception of complaints by the 
Copyright Tribunal would put pressure on music companies to obey the regulation, 
particularly if there were strong sanctions available such as having to leave the New Zealand 
market or large fines, without straining the resources of the Copyright Tribunal beyond a 
functional state. Additionally, allowing anonymous complaints may alleviate the fear of 
repercussions and result in more hesitant music creators raising concerns, as music 
companies would not be able to distinguish with certainty a spontaneous audit from one 
initiated by a complaint.  
4 Legitimacy  
The concept of legitimacy can normatively refer to the validity of political decisions and 
political orders, or descriptively refer to the social acceptance of political decisions and 
whether the actors subject to the decision believe that it is legitimate.204 The proposed 
regulation of revenue distribution in copyright contracts will have the effect of regulating 
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foreign contracts, as it requires music distributed in the New Zealand market to be compliant 
with New Zealand law (including the proposed regulation). Parties who wish to sell music in 
New Zealand will have to ensure that contracts with music creators meet the specified 
standard of remuneration.  
In 2002 Germany introduced a general entitlement to equitable remuneration in its copyright 
contract law, Urhebervertragsrecht.205 The amendment to the law entitles:206   
authors who have received a non-equitable remuneration (or no remuneration at all) … to a 
retrospective variation of their contracts up to a level that the courts regard as common and 
honest practice in the trade … at the time the contract was concluded. 
The German law does not go as far as the regulation proposed by this paper. It does not 
require any copyrighted content that enters the German market to have been produced 
compliantly with German law. However, it does give a domestic right to fair remuneration, 
which may in limited situations extend beyond the boundaries of the German state. 
According to the usual rules of conflict of laws, where there is a sufficient connection to 
Germany a case may be decided under German law.207 Section 32b of the German copyright 
law specifically states that the mandatory provisions in s 32 of the Act (providing for fair 
remuneration) cannot be set aside by a simple choice of the applicable law.208 This means 
that the application of the German right to equitable remuneration may extend to foreign 
entities or individuals if they are domiciled within Germany, or where an entity has a branch 
in Germany and the dispute relates to this branch.209 The German Civil Code of Procedure 
also allows for jurisdiction over producers not located in Germany where they have assets in 
Germany and minimum contacts with Germany.210 Section 32b(2) of the copyright law goes 
further than simple conflict of laws provisions and states that where substantial use of the 
work takes place in Germany, the German law will apply even where the contract is not most 
closely connected to German law.211 This provides some support for the domestic regulation 
of foreign contracts where there is a connection to the domestic market, as is proposed by this 
paper, although admittedly this paper does go further than the German law as it would not be 
limited by conflict of laws rules on the appropriate forum.  
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Regarding the legitimacy of a mandatory standard of creator remuneration, the German law 
also provides some support. The title of the 2002 Amendment is ‘Law on Strengthening the 
Contractual Position of Authors and Performers’ which clearly indicates the intention to 
strengthen the bargaining position of authors and performers.212 The legislative process 
involved controversial positions taken by a number of parties, but final adoption of the 
amendment was premised on compromises which interested groups, including creators and 
the businesses, were willing to accept.213 This stakeholder participation in the formulation of 
the law likely helped it to achieve legitimacy in the descriptive sense; the actors subject to the 
law viewed it as legitimate.  
5 Company response 
The effects which result from this kind of ‘redistribution’ regulation tend to be very complex 
and can be difficult to predict.214 Efforts by the regulatory state to redistribute resources “tend 
to hurt the least well-off, and in any case, to have complex effects, many of them unintended 
and perverse”.215 For example, regulating for a minimum wage tends to result in higher 
unemployment in the low-wage sector, although the consensus among economists on this 
point has been challenged.216 The analogy here is that creating a minimum revenue 
distribution, which targets the lowest paid music creators, will result in lower employment 
among that group as music companies attempt to manage costs. The regulation, therefore, 
may cause a chilling effect on the music industry.  
Additionally, any legislation regulating labour standards is likely to evoke a negative or, at 
the minimum, hesitant response from the industry it is regulating. That negative response 
may translate into a mass exodus from New Zealand. This appears an extreme reaction, but it 
is necessary to remember that New Zealand is a comparatively small market (only 4.6 
million) people and that these regulations may impact the operations of a company in the 
copyright industry significantly.217 Companies that are operating internationally might find 
that it is more expensive to meet the statutory minimums of revenue distribution than to 
simply leave the New Zealand market. Alternatively, companies might choose not to leave 
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the New Zealand market even if remaining is the more expensive option, owing to concerns 
about their public image.  
A likely corollary of withdrawal en masse from the New Zealand market is that music 
infringement levels in New Zealand would increase in response to the sudden unavailability 
of music preferences. Additionally, the use of proxy servers or other technological means of 
accessing legitimate content not available in New Zealand would likely be employed by 
members of the public. Both of these, as well as the initial exit from the New Zealand market, 
would cause the regulation to be ineffective, as music creators would not receive increased 
remuneration. In fact, removing access to legitimate music within New Zealand would result 
in less access to music for the New Zealand public, both failing to achieve the goal of this 
regulation and frustrating the stated aims of copyright.  
It is also likely that music companies that wish to remain operating within the New Zealand 
market but do not wish to increase their operational costs will attempt to game the regulation. 
For example, they may try to alter their contracts so that they do not fall within the scope of 
the regulation as they are not ‘music copyright’ contracts. If the scope of the regulation was 
extended so that it covered all copyright contracts, this may reduce the ability of companies 
to avoid the regulation but it would be much broader than its intended application based on 
the regulatory justification discussed earlier. While many of the creative industries suffer 
from low remuneration, potentially unfair contracts, and weak bargaining power, the 
necessity and likely effects of such a broad regulatory scheme would need to be explored 
independently of this paper, prior to implementation.218  
6 Creator response 
Almost all music creators would be likely to agree with the statement that musicians should 
be paid. The mechanics of achieving that goal may cause more debate. Music creators are a 
diverse group and have a broad range of opinions about copyright and the best way to 
implement it. A 2004 study into artists’ views on the internet and file-sharing revealed split 
opinions about whether file sharing was good or bad.219 There will not be a single ‘creator 
response’ to the proposed regulations.  
The Songwriters Association of Canada commissioned a study into fair compensation for 
musicians which found that the revenue split in the music industry was “grossly inequitable” 
which 94% of revenue going to labels and performing artists, while only 6% on average went 
to songwriters, composers and music publishers.220 It suggested that a 50/50 split between the 
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two groups would be preferable.221 This provides some support for the regulation of music 
industry contracts. Additionally, the American Federation of Musicians sued various music 
labels this year for failing to make required payments from streaming revenue.222 This 
provides evidence that some musicians are unhappy with the way that labels manage their 
finances. However, the study above also noted that Pandora, a music streaming service, 
adopted a payment model based on a previously regulated royalty rate, which acted as “a 
ceiling instead of a floor” of royalty levels.223 While this was an example of a streaming 
service paying the rights holders, the same concern may apply to the split of revenue between 
rights holders. Thus a regulated solution may not be in music creators’ interests.224  
Rolling Stone magazine has written on the subject, describing the unequal revenue split 
between music creators and music labels. It mentions that Maynard James Keenan, the 
frontman for multiple bands one of which released a record independently of music labels in 
2011, had “pulled out” of the relationship with music companies due to the unfair distribution 
of revenue.225 In the same article, Josh Grier, a music-business attorney notes that while the 
disparity in revenue between music companies and music creators is still a point of 
contention, “artists are far more likely to throw up their hands and say, ‘Who gives a crap? 
Let’s just make a pile from touring’”.226 Although under the ‘360 contracts’ described above, 
this response may no longer be an option. 
It is not simply companies in the music industry that might have negative reactions towards 
the proposed regulation; music creators may also have negative responses. While creators 
may support the ideals underlying the regulation, they may find that protections afforded to 
them cause companies which continue to operate in New Zealand to be less willing to 
contract with music creators, particularly those without a record of success. This is because it 
is risky investing in music creators, no one can predict what will be popular with the public 
and so earn high revenues.227 Where music companies do not share that financial risk with 
music creators, as is the case in many copyright contracts where the music company initially 
pays for recording and marketing music, they may prefer to expose themselves to less risk 
overall.228 Requiring a higher share of revenue for music creators results in less money for 
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the music company, which translates to less money to rely on if some of the music contracted 
and marketed by the music company is unsuccessful. The overall consequence is that music 
creators in New Zealand may leave, and those overseas may be more likely to be employed 
by companies which do not comply with the ‘fair distribution’ regulation. Both of these 
responses undermine effective achievement of the goal of the regulation.  
7 Political response 
I do not pretend to possess the prescience to predict the responses of political actors, both 
globally and domestically, which are likely to be both complex and varied. However, this 
suggested regulatory scheme is radical as it allows domestic laws to regulate foreign 
contracts. It seems likely that it will engender some strong responses from political actors, 
both negative and positive. Some, like the various stakeholders in the Fair Trade Music 
scheme promulgated by Eddie Schwartz, may be supportive of this government intervention. 
The music industry itself, which lobbies strongly in many countries including the United 
States, is likely to be opposed to something which impacts its operation so much.229 This may 
result in domestic and international opposition to the regulation, by both industry groups and 
governments who represent their interests, or feel that their sovereignty is being interfered 
with. In an ideal world the regulation would be taken up by key legal systems, such as the 
United States and the European Union, after seeing the New Zealand model, which would 
contribute significantly to its legitimacy, political clout and overall success as the music 
industry could no longer ‘opt out’ by not operating in New Zealand.  Consultation with other 
countries may ease some of the political backlash likely to come from a regulation of this 
kind, however, it is not likely to be internationally popular for the reasons above. 
8 International obligations  
There is no indication that this regulatory response would breach international obligations. As 
the regulation would apply to all music businesses it would be likely to be consistent with 
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, which requires that any advantage granted by a 
contracting party to a product originating in, or destined for, another country shall be 
accorded to like products originating in, or destined for, all other contracting parties.230 It 
would also be consistent with National Treatment which requires that once goods have 
entered a market they are treated no less favourably than like products of national origin.231  
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The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement would not be an obstacle because it relates on to 
technical requirements about a product.232 This regulation relates to contractual terms, not 
product specifications or labelling, so it would not fall under that agreement.  
9 Conclusion on Regulating the Relationship 
While this scheme has laudable regulatory goals, on balance I do not recommend that it is 
implemented. While it seems that it would achieve the regulatory goal of ensuring creators 
are paid more by the music businesses with which they contract, it is unclear whether it will 
have a net benefit on creators in general. Moreover, its implementation is likely to require a 
high level of government investment, at least in the short term, as the Copyright Tribunal will 
need to be extended and have additional resources to effectively manage the number of 
contracts and set an appropriate proportion of revenue distribution in such a complex field. 
Additionally, there is likely to be a strong negative response from the music industry, which 
is a powerful lobbyist in some foreign countries, and from other countries themselves, who 
may feel that New Zealand is interfering with their sovereignty by regulating foreign 
contracts. While Germany has passed a law which may have a similar effect, it only extends 
to foreign countries through conflict of laws provisions (albeit slightly modified conflict of 
laws provisions). Germany also has a large economy and is politically powerful so music 
distribution companies are less likely to leave the German market in response to that law than 
they are to leave the New Zealand market in response to this regulation.  
V Conclusion 
The foregoing discussions establish the market failure and inherent unfairness that results 
when music creators obtain only low proportions of revenue as a result of their weak 
bargaining positions. It then analyses two possible regulatory responses to this situation. FTM 
is a voluntary certification scheme which relies on marketing to ethical consumers, creating a 
competitive advantage among firms which are FTM compliant. Conversely, regulating the 
distribution of copyright revenue is a mandatory scheme which imposes conditions on 
revenue distribution in music creator-music company contracts if that music is distributed 
within the New Zealand market. Both are aimed at the music creator-music company 
relationship.  
Both schemes are likely to encounter obstacles to successful implementation, not least of 
which are the resource costs associated with the implementation and operation of such 
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schemes and the possible stakeholder reluctance to engage with a scheme which interferes so 
much with the ordering of business relationships.  
On balance, this paper recommends against the adoption of mandatory regulation of the 
contractual relationship between music creators and music companies. On the other hand, a 
voluntary FTM certification scheme shows more promise as a successful regulatory response 
if implemented carefully and following a deeper investigation of issues highlighted above.  
Finally, from a practical point it appears unlikely that the New Zealand Government would 
implement a regulation of this kind. There is no groundswell of public support for such a 
proposal and no international consensus that this is an appropriate step. Additionally, the 
Government is currently negotiating expansive trade agreements and adopting this proposal 
which may have a chilling effect on the music industry in New Zealand would likely be an 
unpopular move among other negotiating countries and, without support from key 
international countries, such as the United States, it may weaken New Zealand’s negotiation 
position. 
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